Cooperative dynamics of snowdrift game on spatial distance-dependent small-world networks
Cooperative dynamics of snowdrift game on spatial distance-dependent small-world networks
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DOI：
10.1140/epjb/e2006-00454-8
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发表时间：
2006-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Shang;Xiang Li;Xiaoping Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Shang;Xiang Li;Xiaoping Wang
研究了在雪堆博弈模型下，两个智能体（节点）以概率依赖于其空间欧氏格点距离的幂律形式连接的小世界网络智能体的合作行为的演化. 大量的数值模拟结果表明，不同的指数α值，博弈的动态性主要取决于底层网络的空间拓扑结构.特别地，在α=0的距离无关的情况下，小世界连接模式有助于增强合作，与规则格相比，即使在具有高成本效益比r的情况下。当r≥ 0. 4时，随着α>0的增加，空间距离依赖的小世界（SDSW）结构倾向于抑制雪堆博弈中合作的演化。
We investigate the evolution of cooperative behaviors of small-world networking agents in a snowdrift game mode, where two agents (nodes) are connected with probability depending on their spatial Euclidean lattice distance in the power-law form controlled by an exponent α. Extensive numerical simulations indicate that the game dynamics crucially depends on the spatial topological structure of underlying networks with different values of the exponent α. Especially, in the distance-independent case of α=0, the small-world connectivity pattern contributes to an enhancement of cooperation compared with that in regular lattices, even for the case of having a high cost-to-benefit ratio r. However, with the increment of α>0, when r≥0.4, the spatial distance-dependent small-world (SDSW) structure tends to inhibit the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game.