Auditor choice as a commitment device
Auditor choice as a commitment device
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DOI：
10.1108/jfra-05-2017-0036
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发表时间：
2018-09
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Akihiro Noda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Akihiro Noda
研究目的本研究旨在探讨在内部人与外部人关于公司经济绩效的双边资讯不对称下，公司如何选择审计师。设计/方法/方式-本研究提出了一个时期的报告偏见的游戏与一家公司的风险中性的经理和投资者在资本市场上，在其中一个经理与私人信息选择一个审计师和报告的收益，以获得自己的信息的投资者。分析的重点是管理者聘请审计师约束盈余管理作为一种承诺手段，以尽量减少报告错误成本的可能性。结果-结果表明，管理者的最佳审计师选择的基础上确定的投资者的敏感性，盈余管理和管理激励，报告错误的不确定性折扣。最佳审计师选择的结果是违反直觉的：聘请一个更高质量的审计师似乎与积极的盈余管理。独创性/价值-本研究提出了理解的理论基础，企业的审计师选择的背景下，市场投资者的信息采集时，审计师行使他们的自由裁量权报告。这个问题在现存文献中受到的关注有限。
Purpose This study aims to examine how firms choose an auditor in the presence of bilateral information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders regarding firms’ economic performance. Design/methodology/approach This study presents a one-period reporting bias game with a firm’s risk-neutral manager and investors in the capital market, in which a manager with private information chooses an auditor and reports earnings to investors who acquire their own information. The analysis focuses on the possibility that the manager engages an auditor to constrain earnings management as a commitment device to minimize reporting error cost. Findings The results show that the manager’s optimal auditor choice is determined based on investor sensitivity to the earnings report, and managerial incentives for earnings management, discounted by the uncertainty of reporting errors. The results for optimal auditor choice are counterintuitive: engaging a higher-quality auditor could seemingly be associated with aggressive earnings management. Originality/value This study advances the understanding of the theoretical basis of firms’ auditor choice in the context of market investors’ information acquisition when auditors exercise their discretion in reporting. This issue has received limited attention in the extant literature.