The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force

The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force
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联合国安理会使使用武力合法化的政治根源

DOI:
10.1017/s0020818305050198
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发表时间:
2005
影响因子:
7.8
通讯作者:
E. Voeten
E. Voeten
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
E. Voeten

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至少从波斯湾战争以来,各国的行为“好像”在获得联合国安理会理事会授予的使用武力的合法性方面失败是要付出代价的。对于那些在法律或道德价值观中寻求现代制度合法性根源的理论来说,这一观察结果令人困惑。我认为,当政府和公民寻找一个权威合法化的使用武力,他们一般不寻求一个独立的判断适当的干预,但政治保证的后果,拟议的军事冒险。理事会的决定使使用武力合法化或非法化,因为这些决定形成了关于使用武力是否超越了应当捍卫的限度的广泛接受的政治判断。这些判断成为各国在限制美国实力的同时保持互利合作所面临的合作和协调困境的焦点。在这篇文章中,我讨论了对理事会的合法性和国际合法性理论的影响。这篇文章的早期版本是在2003年国际研究协会会议上提出的,波特兰,俄勒冈州,3月1日;美国政治学协会2003年年会,费城,2003年8月29日;哥伦比亚大学国际政治系列,纽约,2003年9月29日;哈佛大学奥林战略研究所,剑桥,2003年10月6日。我感谢这些研讨会的参与者,国际组织的编辑和匿名裁判;我还要感谢鲍勃·阿克塞尔罗德、布鲁斯·克罗宁、迈克尔·达克、莫妮卡·达菲·托夫特、妮莎·法扎尔、吉姆·费伦、玛莎·芬尼莫尔、佩奇·福特纳、斯泰西戈达德、玛卡坦·汉弗莱斯、伊恩·赫德、帕特里克·撒迪厄斯杰克逊、安德鲁·基德、爱德华·米勒、卡蒂亚·帕帕吉安尼、丽塔·帕哈德、霍尔格施密特、阿图罗·索托马约尔,和乔尔韦斯特拉有用的意见,建议和更正。像往常一样,其余的错误是作者的唯一责任。
Since, at least, the Persian Gulf War, states have behaved “as if” it is costly to be unsuccessful in acquiring the legitimacy the UN Security Council confers on uses of force. This observation is puzzling for theories that seek the origins of modern institutional legitimacy in legalities or moral values. I argue that when governments and citizens look for an authority to legitimize the use of force, they generally do not seek an independent judgment on the appropriateness of an intervention but political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military adventures. Council decisions legitimize or delegitimize uses of force in the sense that they form widely accepted political judgments on whether uses of force transgress a limit that should be defended. These judgments become focal points in the collaboration and coordination dilemmas states face in enforcing limits to U.S. power while preserving mutually beneficial cooperation. In this article, I discuss the implications for the Council's legitimacy and theories of international legitimacy.Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2003 International Studies Association Conference, Portland, Ore., 1 March; the 2003 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 29 August; Columbia University International Politics Series, New York, 29 September 2003; and the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, Cambridge, 6 October 2003. I thank the participants in these seminars, the editor, and anonymous referees of International Organization; and I also thank Bob Axelrod, Bruce Cronin, Michael Dark, Monica Duffy Toft, Nisha Fazal, Jim Fearon, Martha Finnemore, Page Fortna, Stacy Goddard, Macartan Humphries, Ian Hurd, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Andrew Kydd, Edward Miller, Katia Papagianni, Rita Parhad, Holger Schmidt, Arturo Sotomayor, and Joel Westra for useful comments, suggestions, and corrections. As usual, remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author.