Intelligence and general cognitive function: the jangle fallacy.
Intelligence and general cognitive function: the jangle fallacy.
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智力和一般认知功能：叮当谬误。
DOI：
10.1038/s41380-023-02058-3
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
11
通讯作者：
Franz,CarolE
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kremen,WilliamS;Panizzon,MatthewS;Franz,CarolE
jangle 谬误是这样的假设：两个相同或高度相似的事物是不同的，因为它们的命名或标签不同 [1]。 Hu 等人在检查与阿尔茨海默病 (AD) 风险相关的因素时得出了主要结论。[2]是“认知表现可以独立于智力而预防AD”，并且“智力可以独立于认知表现而预防AD”。然而，考虑到 jangle 谬误，这个结论是没有意义的。这里的刺耳谬误指的是智力和认知表现的构造。胡等人。也将认知表现称为一般认知功能，因此我们可以互换使用这两个术语。我们认为，Hu 等人对智力和一般认知功能的概念化是有问题的。正是这种概念化在一定程度上导致了刺耳谬误，即错误地假设这些是不同的结构。胡等人。指出除了智力之外，“一般认知功能评估一个人的整体认知表现，与智力等特定认知能力相比，是一种突出且相对稳定的人类表型。”然而，智力并不是一种特定的认知能力；而是一种特定的认知能力。它代表一般认知功能。事实上，在神经心理学中，智力/一般认知功能总是与特定的认知能力（例如记忆、执行功能或视觉空间能力）区分开来。胡等人。还指出，智力“在很大程度上是在生命早期就固定下来的”。虽然相关结果表明成年期的稳定性，但其他结果表明智力可能不会在整个生命周期中如此固定。生命早期智力的稳定性很难测量，因为用于评估幼儿和成人的认知测试通常需要非常不同。洛锡安出生队列是一个例外，该队列对 11 岁的儿童进行了相同的智力测试，然后对 70 多岁的同一个人进行了同样的智力测试 [3]。在这段很长的时间间隔内，相关性为 0.63，但平均得分增加了 1.12-1.51 个标准差 [3]。相反，当考虑从青年期到老年期的智力时，平均水平变化往往是相反的方向。例如，与 25 岁的人相比，75 岁的人在原始分数较低的情况下获得相同的韦克斯勒智商 [4]。因此，本文的基本论点存在概念上的混乱。具体而言，关于 jangle 谬误，Hu 等人使用的智力和认知表现测量方法的检验。显示出相当大的重叠。正如胡等人。解释一下（他们的补充表 5），他们的认知表现指数基于 COGENT 联盟和英国生物银行的数据。 COGENT 使用了至少 3 个认知测试的第一个主成分（g 分数），其中许多是智力测试子量表。英国生物银行的测量是一项语言-数字推理任务，
The jangle fallacy is the assumption that two identical or highly similar things are different because they are named or labeled differently [1]. In their examination of factors associated with risk for Alzheimer’s disease (AD), the major conclusion of Hu et al.[2] is that “cognitive performance may protect against AD independently of intelligence” and that “intelligence may protect against AD dependently of cognitive performance”. Consideration of the jangle fallacy, however, demonstrates that this conclusion is not meaningful. The jangle fallacy here refers to the constructs of intelligence and cognitive performance. Hu et al. also refer to cognitive performance as general cognitive function, and we therefore use these two terms interchangeably. In our view, Hu et al.’s conceptualization of intelligence and general cognitive function is problematic. It is that conceptualization that leads, in part, to the jangle fallacy, ie, the erroneous assumption that these are distinct constructs. Hu et al. state that in addition to intelligence,“general cognitive function estimates the overall cognitive performance for a person, and is a prominent and relatively stable human phenotype compared with specific cognitive abilities, such as intelligence.” However, intelligence is not a specific cognitive ability; it represents general cognitive function. Indeed, in neuropsychology, intelligence/general cognitive function is always differentiated from specific cognitive abilities such as memory, executive function, or visual-spatial ability. Hu et al. also state that intelligence is “largely fixed early in life.” While correlational results suggest stability in adulthood, other results indicate that intelligence may not be so fixed across the lifespan. Stability of intelligence from early in life is rather hard to measure because the cognitive tests used to evaluate young children and adults usually need to be very different. One exception is the Lothian Birth Cohorts in which the same intelligence test was given to children at age 11 and then to the same individuals in their 70 s [3]. The correlation was 0.63 over this very long interval, but there was a mean score increase of 1.12–1.51 SDs [3]. In contrast, when considering intelligence from young adulthood to older adulthood, mean level change tends to be in the opposite direction. For example, the same Wechsler IQ is achieved with lower raw scores for a 75-year old compared with a 25-year old [4]. Thus, there is conceptual confusion in the basic arguments of the paper.Regarding the jangle fallacy specifically, examination of measures of intelligence and cognitive performance used by Hu et al. shows considerable overlap. As Hu et al. explain (their Supplementary Table 5), their index of cognitive performance is based on data from the COGENT consortium and UK Biobank. COGENT used the first principal component (g-score) of at least 3 cognitive tests, many of which are intelligence test subscales. The UK Biobank measure was a verbal-numeric reasoning task,