Social Choice Theory and the World in Which We Live: Review Article
Social Choice Theory and the World in Which We Live: Review Article
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社会选择理论与我们生活的世界:评论文章
DOI:
10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a035544
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发表时间:
1984
影响因子:
2
通讯作者:
L. Taylor
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
L. Taylor
Social choice theory is political argument by indirection. Its roots can be traced in the Enlightenment—John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the difficulties in formulating a social contract, and Charles de Borda and the Marquis de Condorcet on contradictions in voting rules. The theory took its modern form over a generation ago with the'general possibility theorem'in Kenneth Arrow's book on Social Choice and the Individual Values (1951). Characteristically, the theorem says something cannot happen—that it is not possible to put together the preferences of independent individuals into a social order satisfying four weak-looking conditions of reasonableness. The practical conclusions one draws from this finding remain obscure, despite the fact that it spawned a whole academic discipline. Do social choice economists like many of their mathematical brethren seek only the solace of their formulations or are they trying to enlighten the world? The question is not trivial, as on a higher plane the indirections of religious and ethical innovators (think of the Buddha) demonstrate. We return to it below. Amartya Sen has written brilliantly in many areas of economics and subjects beyond, and as part of this activity he has staked out a claim to being (after Arrow) the world's leading social choice theorist. His collected papers in the area, hereafter called CWM, carry the indirectionist programme forward on several fronts, and then try to apply it to the measurement of poverty and income distribution. The book seems an ideal testing ground for the work of a generation of able minds.Sen's positive implication is that to get over Arrow's barrier to social ordering, we must build scaffolding from information beyond consistent preferences and their aggregation in a'welfaristic'social decision function depending only on individual utility levels. However, this bridgework itself may rest on shifting sands. The book begins with a section of papers attacking the economists' revealed preference theory per se. Recall how revealed preference in the textbooks works. At a given set of prices, a collection of goods x is chosen by a consumer over another collection y. Hence, x is' revealed preferred'to y. If the person is consistent in his or her orderings, the standard theorem on consumer choice follows easily. With real income held constant, she or he will purchase less of a commodity when its price alone goes up. So far, so good (though one might ask with Gustav Cassel what is the use of proving a theorem about inevitably unobservable preferences in the first place). But note various