Non Linear Contracting and Endogenous Buyer Power between Manufacturers and Retailers: Empirical Evidence on Food Retailing in France
Non Linear Contracting and Endogenous Buyer Power between Manufacturers and Retailers: Empirical Evidence on Food Retailing in France
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制造商和零售商之间的非线性契约和内生买家力量：法国食品零售业的经验证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Dubois
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Céline Bonnet;P. Dubois
我们提出了第一个经验估计的结构模型，明确考虑到内生买方力量的下游球员面临两部分关税合同提供的上游水平。我们考虑制造商和零售商之间的纵向合同，其中转售价格维持可以与两部分关税一起使用，并允许零售商从制造商的横向竞争中获得一些内生买方力量。我们的贡献允许在这些不同的结构模型中使用行业结构和需求参数的估计来恢复上游和下游水平的价格成本利润率。我们将其应用到法国瓶装水市场，估计一个混合logit需求模型的个人水平的数据。经验证据表明，两部分关税合同使用没有转售价格维持和超市连锁店的买方势力是内生的制造商的竞争结构。
We present the first empirical estimation of a structural model taking into account explicitly the endogenous buyer power of downstream players facing two part tariffs contracts offered by the upstream level. We consider vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers where resale price maintenance may be used with two part tariffs and allow retailers to have some endogenous buyer power from the horizontal competition of manufacturers. Our contribution allows to recover price-cost margins at the upstream and downstream levels in these different structural models using the industry structure and estimates of demand parameters. We apply it to the market of bottled water in France, estimating a mixed logit demand model on individual level data. Empirical evidence shows that two part tariffs contracts are used with no resale price maintenance and that the buyer power of supermarket chains is endogenous to the structure of manufacturers competition.