Memory-Aware Denial-of-Service Attacks on Shared Cache in Multicore Real-Time Systems
Memory-Aware Denial-of-Service Attacks on Shared Cache in Multicore Real-Time Systems
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DOI：
10.1109/tc.2021.3108044
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发表时间：
2020-05
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
M. Bechtel;H. Yun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Bechtel;H. Yun
在本文中，我们确定，内存性能起着至关重要的作用，对共享缓存执行拒绝服务攻击的可行性和有效性。基于这一见解，我们引入了新的缓存拒绝服务攻击，它可以从用户空间安装，并可能导致极端的最坏情况下的执行时间（WCET）的影响，跨核心的受害者，即使共享的缓存分区，利用平台的内存地址映射信息和HugePage的支持。我们部署这些增强的攻击两个流行的嵌入式乱序多核平台使用合成和现实世界的基准。建议的拒绝服务攻击在测试平台上实现高达111倍的WCET增加。
In this paper, we identify that memory performance plays a crucial role in the feasibility and effectiveness for performing denial-of-service attacks on shared cache. Based on this insight, we introduce new cache DoS attacks, which can be mounted from the user-space and can cause extreme worst-case execution time (WCET) impacts to cross-core victims—even if the shared cache is partitioned—by taking advantage of the platform’s memory address mapping information and HugePage support. We deploy these enhanced attacks on two popular embedded out-of-order multicore platforms using both synthetic and real-world benchmarks. The proposed DoS attacks achieve up to 111X WCET increases on the tested platforms.