Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?
Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?
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DOI：
10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.008
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发表时间：
2006-09-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Bayne, Tim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pacherie, Elisabeth;Green, Melissa;Bayne, Tim
尽管目前的错觉模型一致认为错觉是基于不寻常的经历，但它们在错觉形成过程中赋予经验的作用不同。在某些情况下，这种经历包含了错觉的内容，而在另一些情况下，错觉被用来解释一种不寻常的经历。我们分别把这两种模式称为背书模式和解释主义模式。我们研究了关于“外星人控制”错觉的背书和解释主义模型之间的争论。有外星人控制妄想的人相信他们的行为和/或思想被一个外部代理控制。一些关于外星人控制的描述（例如，Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000）最好用解释主义的术语来思考；其他说法（如Jeannerod， 1999）似乎更适合背书的方法。我们认为，最近的认知和神经生理学证据支持外星人控制错觉的认可模型。(c) 2005爱思唯尔公司版权所有。
Although current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusions are based on unusual experiences, they differ in the role that they accord experience in the formation of delusions. On some accounts, the experience comprises the very content of the delusion, whereas on other accounts the delusion is adopted in an attempt to explain an unusual experience. We call these the endorsement and explanationist models, respectively. We examine the debate between endorsement and explanationist models with respect to the 'alien control' delusion. People with delusions of alien control believe that their actions and/or thoughts are being controlled by an external agent. Some accounts of alien control (e.g., Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a) are best thought of in explanationist terms; other accounts (e.g., Jeannerod, 1999) seem more suited to an endorsement approach. We argue that recent cognitive and neurophysiological evidence favours an endorsement model of the delusion of alien control. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.