FALCON Down: Breaking FALCON Post-Quantum Signature Scheme through Side-Channel Attacks
FALCON Down: Breaking FALCON Post-Quantum Signature Scheme through Side-Channel Attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/dac18074.2021.9586131
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发表时间：
2021-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Emre Karabulut;Aydin Aysu
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文献类型：
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作者：
Emre Karabulut;Aydin Aysu
本文提出了对Falcon的第一次侧向通道攻击，这是Quantum后数字签名标准的NIST第三次入围者。然后，可以通过新的flod-frouner thrunder targion攻击，通过提取符号，mantissa和指数变量而没有误报然后，提取的浮点值将映射回秘密钥匙的系数，尤其是我们的攻击不需要预先介绍目标设备的功率轮廓或制定特殊输入的功率。成功执行我们提出的差异电磁分析。
This paper proposes the first side-channel attack on FALCON—a NIST Round-3 finalist for the post-quantum digital signature standard. We demonstrate a known-plaintext attack that uses the electromagnetic measurements of the device to extract the secret signing keys, which then can be used to forge signatures on arbitrary messages. The proposed attack targets the unique floating-point multiplications within FALCON’s Fast Fourier Transform through a novel extend-and-prune strategy that extracts the sign, mantissa, and exponent variables without false positives. The extracted floating-point values are then mapped back to the secret key’s coefficients. Our attack, notably, does not require pre-characterizing the power profile of the target device or crafting special inputs. Instead, the statistical differences on obtained traces are sufficient to successfully execute our proposed differential electromagnetic analysis. The results on an ARM-Cortex-M4 running the FALCON NIST’s reference software show that approximately 10k measurements are sufficient to extract the entire key.