Non-Cooperative Spectrum Access — The Dedicated vs. Free Spectrum Choice
Non-Cooperative Spectrum Access — The Dedicated vs. Free Spectrum Choice
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DOI：
10.1145/2107502.2107515
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发表时间：
2011-05
影响因子：
16.4
通讯作者：
K. Jagannathan;Ishai Menache;G. Zussman;E. Modiano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Jagannathan;Ishai Menache;G. Zussman;E. Modiano
我们考虑一个动态频谱接入系统，其中次要用户（SU）选择获取专用频谱或使用属于主要用户（PU）的频谱空洞（空白空间）。该决定中包含的权衡是立即但昂贵的传输和免费但延迟的传输（PU 可能出现以及与多个 SU 共享频谱空洞的结果）。我们首先考虑具有单个 PU 频段的系统，其中 SU 决策是固定的。采用排队理论方法，我们获得了与使用 PU 频段相关的预期延迟的显式表达式。在此基础上，我们考虑自利 SU，并将它们之间的相互作用作为非合作博弈进行研究。我们证明了对称纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性，并明确地描述了均衡行为。利用我们的均衡结果，我们展示了如何通过向 SU 租用专用频段来最大化收入，并简要讨论将我们的模型扩展到多个 PU。最后，由于频谱感知可能会消耗资源，因此我们描述了此功能提供的增益。
We consider a dynamic spectrum access system in which Secondary Users (SUs) choose to either acquire dedicated spectrum or to use spectrum-holes (white spaces) which belong to Primary Users (PUs). The trade-off incorporated in this decision is between immediate yet costly transmission and free but delayed transmission (a consequence of both the possible appearance of PUs and sharing the spectrum holes with multiple SUs). We first consider a system with a single PU band, in which the SU decisions are fixed. Employing queueing-theoretic methods, we obtain explicit expressions for the expected delays associated with using the PU band. Based on that, we then consider self-interested SUs and study the interaction between them as a non-cooperative game. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and characterize the equilibrium behavior explicitly. Using our equilibrium results, we show how to maximize revenue from renting dedicated bands to SUs and briefly discuss the extension of our model to multiple PUs. Finally, since spectrum sensing can be resource-consuming, we characterize the gains provided by this capability.