Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House
Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House
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进步联盟？
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
Juan Pablo Micozzi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Juan Pablo Micozzi
政治野心如何影响国会的合作战略？立法者与他们的同龄人一起开展什么活动来最大限度地实现他们的职业目标？在立法机关的主要合作活动之一，共同赞助，已被广泛分析，在文献中作为一个立场采取设备。然而，大多数研究结果都局限于目标是静态的环境（即，这实际上限制了立法合作的各种原因和影响。我分析模式的共同赞助作为一个功能的野心在一个多层次的设置，立法者称赞地方行政职位超过在众议院的席位。通过对1983年至2007年期间阿根廷国会提出的约48，000项法案的分析以及政治生涯地图的发展，我遵循社交网络方法来展开不同的立法合作模式。研究结果表明，未来的州长候选人之间的合作模式是非常积极的，而类似的效果没有观察到在市一级。
How does political ambition affect strategies of cooperation in Congress? What activities do legislators develop with their peers to maximize their career goals? One of the main collaborative activities in a legislature, cosponsorship, has been widely analyzed in the literature as a position taking device. However, most findings have been restricted to environments where ambition is static (i.e., legislators pursuing permanent reelection), which restricts de facto the variety of causes and implications of legislative cooperation. I analyze patterns of cosponsorship as a function of ambition in a multilevel setting where legislators praise subnational executive positions more than a seat in the House. Through the analysis of about 48,000 bills introduced in the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2007 and the development of a map of political careers, I follow a social networks approach to unfold different patterns of legislative cooperation. Findings show that patterns of cooperation among prospective gubernatorial candidates are strongly positive, while similar effects are not observed at the municipal level.