Controlling Shareholders' Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Natural Experiment in China
Controlling Shareholders' Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Natural Experiment in China
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控股股东激励与企业避税：中国的自然实验
DOI：
10.1111/jbfa.12243
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发表时间：
2017-05-01
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Ni, Chenkai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li, Oliver Zhen;Liu, Hang;Ni, Chenkai
股权分置改革允许以前的非流通股按市价自由流通，消除了中国资本市场上的一个重大市场摩擦。这种改革减少了控股股东和小股东之间的代理冲突，因为前者现在更关心股价。我们发现，改革后国有企业的避税行为显著增加，而非国有企业的避税行为没有显著增加。我们将这种差异效应归因于政府作为国有企业控股股东和纳税申报人的双重角色。此外，这一效应对改革前更有可能受到政府影响的国有企业更为明显。最后，改革强化了避税与公司价值之间的正相关关系。总体而言，我们的研究表明，当控股股东更关心股价时，国有企业更多地从事避税活动，以提高公司价值。
The split share structure reform removes a significant market friction in China's capital market by allowing previously non-tradable shares to be freely tradable at market prices. Such a reform reduces the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the former now care more about stock prices. We find that state-owned firms, but not non-state-owned firms, significantly increased their tax avoidance activities after the reform. We attribute this differential effect to the dual role of the government as state-owned firms' controlling shareholder as well as the tax claimant. Further, this effect is more pronounced for state-owned firms that are more likely to be influenced by the government prior to the reform. Finally, the reform reinforces a positive association between tax avoidance and firm value. Overall, our study suggests that when controlling shareholders are more concerned about stock prices, state-owned firms engage more in tax avoidance activities to enhance firm value.