Detecting reliability attacks during split fabrication using test-only BEOL stack
Detecting reliability attacks during split fabrication using test-only BEOL stack
复制标题
使用仅测试的 BEOL 堆栈检测分割制造期间的可靠性攻击
DOI：
10.1145/2593069.2593123
复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Pileggi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kaushik Vaidyanathan;B. P. Das;L. Pileggi
拆分制造是将IC拆分为不可信层和可信层的过程，有助于获得世界上最先进的半导体制造能力，而无需披露设计意图。虽然已经提出了混淆技术来防止在不可信层中的恶意电路插入或修改，但是检测在离岸代工厂中引起的有害可靠性攻击更加难以捉摸。我们描述了一种方法，在不可信的层使用专门的测试只金属堆栈选定的牺牲管芯的组件进行详尽的测试。
Split fabrication, the process of splitting an IC into an untrusted and trusted tier, facilitates access to the most advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities available in the world without requiring disclosure of design intent. While obfuscation techniques have been proposed to prevent malicious circuit insertion or modifications in the untrusted tier, detecting a pernicious reliability attack induced in the offshore foundry is more elusive. We describe a methodology for exhaustive testing of components in the untrusted tier using a specialized test-only metal stack for selected sacrificial dies.