Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions
Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions
复制标题
宽大处理计划：竞争政策中阻止采购拍卖中卡特尔活动的新工具
DOI：
10.1023/a:1026329724892
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
L. Thomas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Karine Brisset;L. Thomas
本文讨论了宽大处理计划对卡特尔内部激励的影响。该计划的目的是鼓励卡特尔成员认罪，并用确凿的证据证明他的同谋者串通协议。我们建立了一个第一价格密封投标采购拍卖下的卡特尔行为的简单模型，并展示了一个有效的宽大程序如何防止卡特尔成员的内部协调。
This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members.