Bioterrorism risk communication policy
Bioterrorism risk communication policy
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DOI:
10.1080/10810730390225036
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发表时间:
2003-06-01
影响因子:
4.4
通讯作者:
Sandman, PM
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Sandman, PM
I really enjoyed the drafts of these papers. I learned an enormous amount about the dayto-day reality of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) anthrax communication efforts—information that will certainly prove helpful as CDC and other organizations prepare to cope with future bioterrorist attacks. These papers are full of wonderful illustrations of successful approaches to be replicated and unsuccessful ones to be reconsidered. They are an extraordinarily practical, useful set of papers. But I am struck by what isn’t here: the tough policy choices that CDC’s anthrax risk communication effort either confronted or evaded and that future bioterrorism risk communication efforts must face.Instead of addressing communication policy, the papers focus primarily on communication logistics, on procedures. Two papers discuss tracking public opinion, a third addresses tracking media content, and a fourth compares CDC anthrax news releases to what the media actually reported. There is a paper focusing on message complexity, the need to pretest, and issues of health literacy. There’s an exploration of efforts to get information from scientists to journalists quickly while maintaining standards of accuracy.(This paper does raise an important policy issue—the pros and cons of getting out uncertain information quickly—but addresses that issue only indirectly.) There’sa study of optimistic bias among corporate managers. Among the policy issues I would have liked to see discussed are: