The Evolution of Cooperation is Affected by the Persistence of Fitness Effects, the Neighborhood Size and their Interaction.
The Evolution of Cooperation is Affected by the Persistence of Fitness Effects, the Neighborhood Size and their Interaction.
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DOI：
10.1080/23737867.2015.1090890
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Rueppell O
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thompson E;Everett J;Rowell JT;Rychtář J;Rueppell O
进化博弈论和囚徒困境（PD）博弈已被用来研究合作的进化。我们考虑一个无性繁殖的种群，年龄结构的个体在二维方形晶格结构中。个体在重复的互动中对邻居采用固定的合作或背叛策略来积累生殖适应性。我们关注过去互动的持续性和互动邻居大小对合作演变的影响。研究表明，较大的社区规模通常不利于合作，而适应性效应的持续存在降低了小社区合作进化的可能性。然而，对于较大的邻域大小，持久性效应是相反的。因此，我们的研究证实了早期的研究，即群体结构增加了PD范式中合作行为的进化潜力。这一发现可能解释了先前关于邻域大小影响的结果的异质性，并警告说，在分析合作行为的进化时需要考虑适应性结果的持久性。在生物和社会系统中，成对相互作用的适应性结果的持久性可能会有很大的不同，并可能对各种环境下合作的进化产生深远的影响。
Evolutionary Game Theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Game in particular have been used to study the evolution of cooperation. We consider a population of asexually reproducing, age-structured individuals in a two-dimensional square lattice structure. The individuals employ fixed cooperative or defecting strategies towards their neighbors in repeating interactions to accumulate reproductive fitness. We focus on the effects of the persistence of past interactions and interactive neighborhood size on the evolution of cooperation. We show that larger neighborhood sizes are generally detrimental to cooperation and that the persistence of fitness effects decreases the likelihood of the evolution of cooperation in small neighborhoods. However, for larger neighborhood sizes the persistence effect is reversed. Thus, our study corroborates earlier studies that population structure increases the evolutionary potential for cooperative behavior in a PD paradigm. This finding may explain the heterogeneity of previous results on the effect of neighborhood size and cautions that the persistence of fitness outcomes needs to be considered in analyses of the evolution of cooperative behavior. The persistence of fitness outcomes of pairwise interactions may vary dramatically in biological and social systems and could have profound effects on the evolution of cooperation in various contexts.