Distraction Can Enhance or Reduce Yielding to Propaganda: Thought Disruption Versus Effort Justification
Distraction Can Enhance or Reduce Yielding to Propaganda: Thought Disruption Versus Effort Justification
复制标题
分心可以增强或减少对宣传的屈服:思想干扰与努力辩护
DOI:
10.1037/0022-3514.34.5.874
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发表时间:
1976
影响因子:
7.6
通讯作者:
T. Brock
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Petty;G. Wells;T. Brock
Two experiments were conducted to test competing accounts of the distractionpersuasion relationship, thought disruption and effort justification, and also to show that the relationship is not limited to counterattitudinal communication. Experiment 1 varied distraction and employed two discrepant messages differing in how easy they were to counterargue. In accord with the thought disruption account, increasing distraction enhanced persuasion for a message that was readily counterarguable, but reduced persuasion for a message that was difficult to counterargue. The effort notion implied no interaction with message counterarguability. Experiment 2 again varied distraction but the two messages took a nondiscrepant position. One message elicited primarily favorable thoughts and the effect of distraction was to reduce the number of favorable thoughts generated; the other, less convincing message elicited primarily counterarguments, and the effect of distraction was to reduce counterarguments. A Message X Distraction interaction indicated that distraction tended to enhance persuasion for the counterarguable message but reduce persuasion for the message that elicited primarily favorable thoughts. The experiments together provided support for a principle having greater generality than the Festinger-Maccoby formulation: Distraction works by inhibiting the dominant cognitive response to persuasive communication and, therefore, it can result in either enhanced or reduced acceptance.