Pathos: Rhetoric and Emotion
Pathos: Rhetoric and Emotion
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悲情：修辞与情感
DOI：
10.1002/9780470999851.ch14
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Kastely
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Kastely
谁真的不知道演说家的美德，无论是激起人们的愤怒、仇恨或愤慨，还是唤醒他们从同样的激情中恢复到温和和仁慈，都是卓越的表现呢？因此，除非演讲者对人的性格、人性的全部范围以及我们灵魂被刺激或退却的动机有了深刻的洞察，否则他不能通过他的话达到他想要的东西。(西塞罗1942：41)克拉苏似乎认为使用情感在理论上是没有问题的，主要是一个战略上的必要问题。但并不是每个人都同意西塞罗的观点，即通过以情感为基础或以情感为支撑的呼吁来说服观众是可取的。事实上，康德等哲学家认为，行动应该由理性指导，并坚持认为，情感感动受众的力量需要得到控制，因为如果不加以控制，它会危及伦理自治，并使人类生活受到理性之外的力量的影响。修辞学的大部分历史都可以写成接受这种情感取代理性的可能性。有些修辞者，比如戈尔吉亚斯，并没有被这种明显的危险所困扰，只是简单地接受了情感的力量；另一些修辞者，比如西塞罗，承认了一个潜在的问题，并试图展示情感如何与理性合作或为理性服务。在任何一种情况下，都有一个假设，即理性和情感是截然不同的。然而，还有第三种选择。从苏格拉底在《菲德勒斯》中恢复性爱开始，继续当代弗洛伊德的一些译者的工作，一个更有希望的辩护可以是
Who indeed does not know that the orator’s virtue is pre-eminently manifested either in rousing men’s hearts to anger, hatred, or indignation, or in recalling them from these same passions to mildness and mercy? Wherefore the speaker will not be able to achieve what he wants by his words, unless he has gained profound insight into the characters of men, and the whole range of human nature, and those motives whereby our souls are spurred on or turned back.(Cicero 1942: 41)Crassus seems to consider the use of emotion as theoretically unproblematic, as primarily a matter of strategic necessity. But not everyone agrees with Cicero that persuading an audience through appeals grounded in or buttressed by emotion is desirable. In fact, philosophers such as Kant believe that action should be guided by reason and insist the power of emotion to move audiences needs to be controlled because, uncontrolled, it endangers ethical autonomy and opens human lives to determination by forces outside of rationality. Much of the history of rhetoric can be written as a coming to terms with this possibility of emotion’s displacing reason. Some rhetors, like Gorgias, are untroubled by this apparent danger and simply embrace the power of emotion; others, like Cicero, acknowledge a potential problem and seek to show how emotion can cooperate with or serve reason. In either case, there is an assumption that reason and emotion are distinct. There is, however, a third alternative. Starting with Socrates’ recovery of Eros in Phaedrus and continuing in the work of some contemporary interpreters of Freud, a more promising defense can be