Frege’s conception of logic
Frege’s conception of logic
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弗雷格的逻辑概念
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
W. Goldfarb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Goldfarb
这篇短文从两个主要观点简要阐述了弗雷格的逻辑观：其逻辑观的新颖性和逻辑在其著作中的规范地位。我通过将弗雷格与密尔和康德的观点进行比较来分析弗雷格在逻辑方面的立场。我还反对对弗雷格关于逻辑本质的著作进行规范性解读，这种解读在当代文学中并不罕见。
This short essay offers a brief account of Frege’s conception of logic from two main points of view: the novelty of his view on logic and the normative status of logic in his writings. I analyze Frege’s position with regard to logic by comparing it to the views of Mill and Kant. I also argue against a normative reading of Frege’s writings on the nature of logic, a reading which is not uncommon in contemporary literature.