Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
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市场设计和组合时钟拍卖的演变
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Oleg Baranov
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lawrence M. Ausubel;Oleg Baranov
组合时钟拍卖（CCA）是近年来拍卖设计的一项重要创新，已被全球许多频谱拍卖所采用。自成立以来，CCA几乎一直在不断发展。我们首先回顾已经发生的一些重要变化。尽管有这些增强，但我们观察到CCA的性能仍然受到弱活动规则、次优价格反馈和漏标问题的限制。然后，我们描述了进一步的进化变化，包括新的活动规则，新的定价方法，以及非互斥投标的整合，这将有助于解决这些问题。
The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design which has been adopted for many spectrum auctions worldwide. Since its inception, the CCA has been in almost continual evolution. We begin by reviewing some important changes which have already occurred. Despite these enhancements, we observe that the performance of the CCA is still limited by weak activity rules, suboptimal price feedback, and a missing-bid problem. We then describe further evolutionary changes, including new activity rules, new approaches to pricing, and an integration of non-mutually-exclusive bids, which will help to address these issues.