Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players
Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players
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与厌恶不确定性的玩家进行广泛形式的博弈
DOI：
10.1006/game.1998.0696
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
K. Lo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Lo
现有的博弈均衡概念利用Savage（1954）公理化的主观期望效用模型来表示参与者的偏好。相应地，每个参与者对对手策略的信念由概率度量表示。受Ellsberg Paradise和相关实验结果的启发，证明决策者的信念可能无法用概率测度来表示，本文将有限扩展形式博弈中的纳什均衡推广到符合吉尔博亚和Schmeidler（1989）提出的多先验模型的偏好。这种泛化的策略选择和福利的影响进行了研究。
Existing equilibrium concepts for games make use of the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage (1954) to represent players' preferences. Accordingly, each player's beliefs about the strategies played by opponents are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by the Ellsberg Paradox and relevant experimental findings demonstrating that the beliefs of a decision maker may not be representable by a probability measure, this paper generalizes Nash Equilibrium in finite extensive form games to allow for preferences conforming to the multiple priors model developed in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare are studied.