Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives and Job Design
Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives and Job Design
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职业问题、金钱激励和工作设计
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00453.x
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Trond E. Olsen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
O. Kaarbøe;Trond E. Olsen
我们研究了当承诺有限、代理人有多个任务和职业关注时的最优激励契约。经纪人的职业生涯是由外部市场决定的。我们表明，委托人可能希望给予代理人最强烈的明确激励，而不是退休，以解释职业问题可能导致与委托人偏好相冲突的行为这一事实。此外，我们还表明，职业关注的强度可能会降低福利最大化，最优激励可以与各种不确定性措施正相关，并且职业激励对最优工作设计有很强的影响。
We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent's career concerns are determined by the outside market. We show that the principal might want to give the strongest explicit incentives to agents far from retirement to account for the fact that career concerns might induce behavior in conflict with the principal's preferences. Furthermore, we show that maximized welfare might be decreasing in the strength of career concerns, that optimal incentives can be positively correlated with various measures of uncertainty, and that career incentives have strong implications for optimal job design.
DOI：
10.2307/2987329
发表时间：
1970-06
期刊：
--
影响因子：
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作者：
M. Degroot
通讯作者：
M. Degroot