Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game
Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jue.2004.10.007
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发表时间：
2005-03-01
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
van Ypersele, T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Peralta, S;van Ypersele, T
这篇论文讨论了任意数量国家之间的资本税竞争。各国不仅在人口禀赋方面不对称，而且在居民人均资本禀赋方面也是不对称的。各国政府对资本和劳动力征税，以便为固定的公共预算提供资金。不对称的资本税制产生于均衡状态，导致国际资本市场的扭曲。我们充分描述了均衡税收和福利水平如何取决于各国的人口和资本禀赋。我们将其与自给自足的情况进行比较，发现财政竞争侵蚀了资本市场自由化的部分(但不是全部)收益。(C)2004 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。
This paper addresses capital tax competition among an arbitrary number of countries. Countries are asymmetric not only in their population endowment but also in their capital endowment per inhabitant. National governments tax capital and labor in order to finance a fixed public budget. Asymmetric capital taxation arises at equilibrium leading to a distortion on the international capital market. We fully characterize how equilibrium taxes and welfare levels depend upon countries' population and capital endowments. We compare it to the autarky situation and show that fiscal competition erodes some, but not all, of the gains from capital markets liberalization. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.