An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration
An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration
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DOI：
10.1287/mksc.1070.0335
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发表时间：
2008-01-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Staelin, Richard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
McGuire, Timothy W.;Staelin, Richard
本文研究了产品替代性对双寡头垄断中纳什均衡分销结构的影响，在这种双寡头垄断情形下，每个制造商都通过一个独家零售商分销其商品，该零售商可能是特许经营店，也可能是工厂直营店。假定了静态线性需求和成本函数，并检验了一些关于参与者对竞争对手行为预期的规则。研究发现，对于大多数设定而言，产品替代性确实会影响均衡分销结构。对于替代程度较低的情况，每个制造商都会通过公司直营店分销其产品；对于竞争更激烈的商品，制造商更有可能采用分散式分销系统。
This paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on Nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer, which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store. Static linear demand and cost functions are assumed, and a number of rules about players' expectations of competitors' behavior are examined. It is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure. For low degrees of substitutability, each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store; for more highly competitive goods, manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system.