Authenticating Pervasive Devices with Human Protocols
Authenticating Pervasive Devices with Human Protocols
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DOI：
10.1007/11535218_18
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发表时间：
2005-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Juels;Stephen A. Weis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Juels;Stephen A. Weis
伪造和假冒正在成为低成本普及计算设备中的严重安全风险。这些设备缺乏大多数密码认证方案所必需的计算、存储、电力和通信资源。令人惊讶的是，像射频识别（RFID）标签这样的低成本普及设备与另一种弱计算设备（人）具有相似的能力。这些相似性促使从人机安全到普及计算环境的技术的采用。本文分析了Hopper和Blum（HB）设计的一种特殊的人机认证协议，并证明了它对低成本普适设备的实用性。本文给出了HB协议对被动攻击者的一个改进的、具体的安全性证明，并给出了HB协议对主动攻击者的一个新的、增强的版本HB+。HB+协议是一种新颖的对称认证协议，具有简单，低成本的实现。我们证明了HB+协议对主动对手的硬度的基础上学习奇偶噪声（LPN）问题的安全性。
Forgery and counterfeiting are emerging as serious security risks in low-cost pervasive computing devices. These devices lack the computational, storage, power, and communication resources necessary for most cryptographic authentication schemes. Surprisingly, low-cost pervasive devices like Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags share similar capabilities with another weak computing device: people.These similarities motivate the adoption of techniques from human-computer security to the pervasive computing setting. This paper analyzes a particular human-to-computer authentication protocol designed by Hopper and Blum (HB), and shows it to be practical for low-cost pervasive devices. We offer an improved, concrete proof of security for the HB protocol against passive adversaries.This paper also offers a new, augmented version of the HB protocol, named HB+, that is secure against active adversaries. The HB+protocol is a novel, symmetric authentication protocol with a simple, low-cost implementation. We prove the security of the HB+protocol against active adversaries based on the hardness of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem.