Farsighted Coalitional Stability
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
复制标题
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1044
复制
发表时间：
1994-08
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
M. Chwe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Chwe
我定义了最大的一致集，一个解决方案的概念，适用于联盟自由形成，但不能制定有约束力的合同，公开行动，并充分“远见”的情况下，一个联盟认为，一旦它的行动，另一个联盟可能会作出反应，第三个联盟可能会反过来作出反应，等等，没有限制。我建立了弱非空条件，并将其应用于战略和联盟形式的游戏和多数规则投票。我认为，它改进了冯诺依曼-摩根斯坦稳定集，因为它通常是定义，但与稳定集的概括，如在社会情况下的理论是一致的。
I define the largest consistent set, a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts, act publicly, and are fully ``farsighted'' in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts, another coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on, without limit. I establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting. I argue that it improves on the von Neumann- Morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations.