Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance
Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance
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DOI：
10.1017/s0020818300033178
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发表时间：
1991-09
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
J. Frieden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Frieden
资本现在跨越国界的流动速度比至少50年来，甚至历史上任何时候都要快。本文探讨了资本流动对国家社会中不同群体和经济决策政治的影响。它首先强调，虽然金融市场在发达国家内部高度一体化，但许多投资在公司、部门或地点方面仍然相当具体。然后，它认为，当代水平的国际资本流动有不同的社会经济群体的影响。从长远来看，资本流动性的增加往往有利于资本所有者而不是其他群体。从短期来看，资本输出国特定部门的所有者和工人承担了适应资本流动性增加的大部分负担。这些模式预计将导致在是否鼓励或增加国际资本市场一体化方面出现政治分歧。文章还论证了资本流动性也会影响其他经济政策的政治性。最重要的是，它将辩论转向汇率作为一种中间或最终的政策工具。在这种背景下，它倾向于将支持汇率稳定的群体与更关心国家货币政策自主权，因此不太关心汇率稳定的群体分开。同样，它也会在支持升值汇率的群体和支持贬值汇率的群体之间制造隔阂。这些分歧对欧洲货币和货币联盟、美元对日元汇率以及国际宏观经济政策协调等经济政策具有重要影响。
Capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history. This article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking. It begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world, many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm, sector, or location. It then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups. Over the long run, increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups. In the shorter run, owners and workers in specific sectors in capital-exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility. These patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration. The article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies. Most centrally, it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument. In this context, it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability. Similarly, it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one. These divisions have important implications for such economic policies as European monetary and currency union, the dollar-yen exchange rate, and international macroeconomic policy coordination.