Present-biased lobbyists in linear–quadratic stochastic differential games
Present-biased lobbyists in linear–quadratic stochastic differential games
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DOI：
10.1007/s00780-023-00519-9
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发表时间：
2023-04
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
A. Lazrak;Hanxiao Wang;J. Yong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Lazrak;Hanxiao Wang;J. Yong
我们研究了一个线性二次随机零和游戏，其中两个玩家游说政治代表投资风电场。玩家在时间上不一致，因为他们以非恒定比率贴现效用。我们的目标是确定一致的规划平衡，使参与者意识到自己的不一致，并且不能承诺游说政策。我们分析单人游戏和双人游戏情况下的均衡行为，并比较恒定和可变折扣率下的游戏行为。平衡行为以闭环形式提供，可以通过分析或通过数值近似。我们对均衡的数值分析表明，战略行为会导致更强烈的游说，但不会导致过度调整。
We investigate a linear–quadratic stochastic zero-sum game where two players lobby a political representative to invest in a wind farm. Players are time-inconsistent because they discount the utility with a non-constant rate. Our objective is to identify a consistent planning equilibrium in which the players are aware of their inconsistency and cannot commit to a lobbying policy. We analyse equilibrium behaviour in both single-player and two-player cases and compare the behaviours of the game under constant and variable discount rates. The equilibrium behaviour is provided in closed-loop form, either analytically or via numerical approximation. Our numerical analysis of the equilibrium reveals that strategic behaviour leads to more intense lobbying without resulting in overshooting.