Truthmaking without necessitation
Truthmaking without necessitation
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没有必要讲真话
DOI：
10.1007/s11229-012-0093-z
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
R. Briggs
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Briggs
我提出了一个关于真相制造的解释，它为负面真相提供了真相制造者。该帐户取代Truthmaker必然性与“复制原则”，根据该原则，一个合适的实体T是一个truthmaker为propositionp只是在情况下，一个适当的对应存在的Tentals真理的p，其中对应关系兑现了在定性复制方面。我的叙述抓住了真理创造者作为“事物本来的样子”的直观概念，验证了大卫·阿姆斯特朗提出的关于蕴涵和包容的两个吸引人的原则，并使有争议的析取命题无效。
I propose an account truthmaking that provides truthmakers for negative truths. The account replaces Truthmaker Necessitarianism with a “Duplication Principle”, according to which a suitable entityTis a truthmaker for a propositionpjust in case the existence of an appropriate counterpart ofTentails the truth ofp, where the counterpart relation is cashed out in terms of qualitative duplication. My account captures an intuitive notion of truthmakers as “things the way they are”, validates two appealing principles about entailment and containment proposed by David Armstrong, and invalidates the controversial Disjunction Thesis.