Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy
Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy
复制标题
官僚政治控制的委托代理模型
DOI：
10.2307/1962069
复制
发表时间：
1989
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
B. Dan Wood
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brian J. Cook;B. Dan Wood
在1988年3月的这篇评论中，B。丹·伍德（Dan Wood）援引委托代理的观点来确立民主等级制度在塑造公共官僚机构产出方面的重要性。他在1977年至1985年期间用环境保护署（EPA）的空气污染执法部门测试了这个模型。他的研究结果表明，官僚机构对选举产生的政治机构的反应存在一定的局限性，这与强调代理人的委托-代理人观点一致。Brian J. Cook对Wood的分层模型的设计和实证检验提出了挑战。他质疑伍德对环境保护局自主权和权力程度的描述的准确性。库克认为，一个适当的模型需要承认美国制度的多重主体性质，他主张考虑委托代理理论的规范基础。伍德对所提出的实质性问题和方法论问题作出了回应，并建议在未来的研究中采取折衷的方法。
In the March 1988 issue of this Review, B. Dan Wood invoked a principal-agent perspective to establish the importance of democratic hierarchies in shaping the outputs of public bureaucracies. He tested the model with air pollution enforcements of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) between 1977 and 1985. His results suggested some limitations on bureaucracies' responsiveness to elected political institutions, consistent with a principal-agent perspective with emphasis on the agent. Brian J. Cook challenges features of the design and empirical testing of Wood's hierarchical model. He questions the accuracy of Wood's characterization of the extent of EPA autonomy and power. Cook argues that a proper model requires recognition of the multiple principal nature of the U.S. system, and he advocates consideration of the normative foundations of principal-agent theory. Wood responds to both the substantive and methodological issues raised and suggests an eclectic approach in future research.