Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms
Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms
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均衡工资差异和议价能力：来自法国公司小组的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Zylberberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Cahuc;C. Gianella;Dominique Goux;A. Zylberberg
在本文中，我们沿着Manning（1993）的思路，建立了一个企业层面讨价还价的动态模型。在这种情况下，我们提供了一个明确说明企业异质性的企业水平工资方程。这一工资等式用劳动生产率和工作更替率的差异解释了公司间工资差异。更准确地说，我们的模型预测，一家公司的工作岗位破坏率越高，工人的报酬就越高。我们估计我们的工资方程使用匹配的雇主-雇员面板数据在制造业，其中公司被跟踪五年，1988年至1992年。经验估计，使用GMM技术，是完全符合我们的理论预测的均衡差异：工人谁考虑到他们的跨期贴现收入将支持较低的工资时，他们受益于较低的失业风险在他们的公司。在我们的模型中，工资被设定为最大化纳什讨价还价标准，根据所使用的估计量或我们考虑的行业，我们表明工人的平均议价能力在0.15到0.25之间，从0到1。
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of firm-level bargaining, along the lines of Manning (1993). In this context, we provide a firm level wage equation that explicitly accounts for firm heterogeneity. This wage equation explains inter-firm wage differentials by differences in labour productivity and job turnover. More precisely, our model predicts that the higher the rate of job destruction within one firm, the higher the compensation of workers. We estimate our wage equation using matched employer-employee panel data in the manufacturing sector, where firms are tracked for five years, between 1988 and 1992. The empirical estimates, using GMM techniques, are fully consistent with our theoretical prediction of equalizing differences: workers who take into account their intertemporal discounted income will support lower wages when they benefit from lower unemployment risks within their firm. In our model, wages are set to maximize a Nash bargain criterion, and according to the estimators used or the industry we consider, we show that workers have an average bargaining power between 0.15 and 0.25, measured on a scale going from 0 to 1.