The hidden hand of economic coercion
The hidden hand of economic coercion
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DOI：
10.1017/s0020818303573052
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发表时间：
2003-06-01
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Drezner, DW
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Drezner, DW
尽管学者们认为经济制裁是一种无效的治国工具，但为什么政策制定者一直在使用经济制裁呢？经济胁迫的博弈论模型表明，由于选择效应，成功率可能被低估了。当目标国更愿意承担制裁的代价时，它就有在实施制裁之前默许的动机。因此，大部分成功的胁迫事件都应该以威胁而不是施加制裁来结束。这与最近关于制裁的文献相矛盾，后者假定制裁很少(如果有的话)能促使目标国做出重大让步，而且是出于国内或象征性的政治原因而实施的。如果博弈论的论点是正确的，那么需要研究的关键案例是那些胁迫受到威胁但没有实施的案例。对追求经济或监管目标的制裁数据进行的统计分析，有力地支持了博弈论的观点。这些结果表明，在更广泛的治国方略和国际关系研究中，经济胁迫的重要性被低估了。
Why do policymakers consistently employ economic sanctions even though scholars consider them an ineffective tool of statecraft? Game-theoretic models of economic coercion suggest the success rate may be understated because of selection effects. When the targeted country prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions, it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions. The bulk of successful coercion episodes should therefore end with sanctions threatened but not imposed. This contradicts the recent literature on sanctions, which assumes that sanctions rarely, if ever, work at generating significant concessions from the targeted country and are imposed for domestic or symbolic political reasons. If the game-theoretic argument is correct, the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not implemented. A statistical analysis of data on sanctions in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals strongly supports the game-theoretic argument. These results suggest that the significance of economic coercion has been undervalued in the study of statecraft and international relations more generally.