Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism
Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism
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DOI：
10.1016/b978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4
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发表时间：
2013-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ditto, Peter H.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Graham, Jesse;Haidt, Jonathan;Ditto, Peter H.
道德从何而来？为什么不同文化的道德判断往往如此相似，但有时又如此多变？道德是一件事，还是很多？道德基础理论（MET）就是为了回答这些问题而创立的。在本章中，我们描述了理论的起源，假设和当前的概念化，并详细介绍了MET在社会心理学内外的实证研究结果。展望未来，我们接受对该理论的几个批评，并指定五个标准来确定什么应该被认为是人类道德的基础。最后，我们提出了各种未来方向的MFT和道德心理学。
Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MET) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter, we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory and detail the empirical findings that MET has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and moral psychology.