How cross‐shareholding influences financial reporting: Evidence from Japan
How cross‐shareholding influences financial reporting: Evidence from Japan
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交叉持股如何影响财务报告：来自日本的证据
DOI：
10.1111/corg.12333
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Muramiya Katsuhiko and Takada Tomomi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
小野慎一郎;椎葉淳;村宮克彦;石川博行;Oura Keisuke;井上定子;石川博行;村宮 克彦;橋本武久;Oura Keisuke;檜山純;飛鳥 由美子;石川博行;井上定子;高橋二朗;井上定子;檜山純;橋本武久;Oura Keisuke;Muramiya Katsuhiko and Takada Tomomi
研究课题本研究调查了交叉持股对日本市场的财务报告和信息环境的影响，并假设交叉持股越多，由于交叉持股使管理者更加牢固，因此收益确认的合同效率越低，信息不对称程度越高。此外，我们还对由于交叉持股而孤立于市场压力之外、固守现状的管理者，是为了实现自身利益最大化，还是为了享受平静的生活进行了调查。研究结果/见解通过对日本上市公司交叉持股的独特数据进行分析，我们发现，交叉持股越多，损失确认的及时性越低，基于信息的交易概率越高。进一步的研究表明，较高的交叉持股与（3）较低的绝对预测误差和（4）较低的研发支出有关。前两项研究结果表明，交叉持股巩固了管理者，最后两项研究结果表明，根深蒂固的经理人享受平静的生活。理论/学术含义本研究通过提供新的证据，表明交叉持股通过诱导经理人变得根深蒂固并享受平静的生活，从而影响财务报告和市场信息环境，从而为公司治理文献做出了贡献。政策含义本研究为交叉持股是一种常见所有权形式的市场中的政策制定者提供了启示。为了提高合同效率的财务报告和/或减少市场上的信息不对称，可能有必要减少交叉持股。
Research Question/IssueThis study investigates the effect of cross‐shareholding on financial reporting and the information environment in the Japanese market and hypothesizes that higher cross‐shareholding is related to lower contract‐efficient earnings recognition and higher information asymmetry because cross‐shareholding entrenches managers. Furthermore, we investigate whether managers try to maximize their self‐interest or to enjoy a quiet life when they are isolated from market pressure and entrenched owing to cross‐shareholding.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a unique dataset on cross‐shareholding among Japanese listed firms, we find that higher cross‐shareholding is associated with (1) less timely loss recognition and (2) higher probability of information‐based trading. Further investigation clarifies that higher cross‐shareholdings are related to (3) lower absolute forecast error and (4) lower R&D expenditures. The first two findings indicate that cross‐shareholding entrenches managers, and the last two findings show that entrenched managers enjoy a quiet life.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study contributes to the corporate governance literature by providing new evidence that cross‐shareholding influences financial reporting and the information environment in the market by inducing managers to become entrenched and to enjoy a quiet life.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study provides implications for policymakers in markets in which cross‐shareholding is a common ownership format. To enhance contract‐efficient financial reporting and/or reduce information asymmetry in the market, it may be necessary to reduce cross‐shareholding.