Absorption Capacity and Disbursement Constraints
Absorption Capacity and Disbursement Constraints
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吸收能力和支付限制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Svensson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Svensson
为什么捐赠者和接受者会这样做？在本文中，我通过讨论捐助者和受助者面临的一些最重要的激励约束来提供一些部分答案。其中一些激励约束，如多重目标、衡量产出或结果的困难以及绩效激励薄弱，是大多数公共机构面临的问题，尽管这些问题在捐助机构中往往更为明显。更重要的是，外国援助部门有一些独特的特征，包括多个代理人（捐助者）以及受益人（受援国）与选民和政治家（捐助国）之间薄弱或破碎的信息/问责反馈循环。捐助机构的激励措施也会影响受援者的行为以及他们有效利用援助的能力。本文将讨论支付和吸收援助的激励问题以及它们在决定外援效率方面如何相互作用。这样做主要是突出问题，但也在一定程度上讨论前进的方向。
Why do donors and recipients act the way they do? In this paper I provide some partial answers by discussing some of the most important incentive constraints facing donors and recipients. Some of these incentive constraints, like multiple objectives, difficulties in measuring output or outcomes, and weak performance incentives, are problems most public agencies face, although they are often more pronounced in donor agencies. More important, there are features that are unique to the foreign aid sector, including multiple agents (donors) and a weak or broken information/accountability feedback loop between beneficiaries (in the recipient country) and voters and politicians (in the donor country). The donor agencies’ incentives also influence the recipients’ behavior, and their ability to use aid productively. This paper will discuss the incentive problems in disbursing and absorbing aid and how they interact in determining the efficiency of foreign aid. In so doing, it will mostly highlight problems, but to some extent also discuss ways forward.