House Allocation with Transfers
House Allocation with Transfers
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房屋分配及转让
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2703
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Eiichi Miyagawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eiichi Miyagawa
我们考虑允许货币转移的Shapley-Scarf房屋分配问题，这些机制是策略的，事后是个人理性的，预算均匀的平衡和“串通”。每个对象的价格都会提前确定，并且对象确实是根据Shapley -Scarf经济的（独特的）核心分配的。零是Shapley的核心机制，我们的机制是Groves机制的令人信服的替代品，这些机制既不满足预算平衡，也不满足我们的勾结经济文献分类。 D78，D89。
We consider the Shapley–Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget-balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley–Scarf economy associated with the prices. The special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanism studied by Shapley and Scarf. Our mechanisms are compelling alternatives to the Groves mechanisms, which satisfy neither budget balance nor our condition of collusion-proofness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78, D89.