Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure?

Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure?
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DOI:
10.1086/261547
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发表时间:
1988-06
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
H. Carmichael
H. Carmichael
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
H. Carmichael

文献摘要

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本文将学术部门作为一个内部劳动力市场进行建模。大学管理部门面临的主要问题是确保各院系的成员愿意雇用最好的候选人。学术终身职位被认为是实现这一目标的必要条件。这一分析也与学术环境的其他方面相一致,包括“终身教职”任命、合同买断、提前退休计划,以及在预算紧缩时取消整个院系。结果以一种简单的方式扩展到其他组织,在这些组织中,成员可以对整体决策进行输入。
This paper models ancademic department as an internal labor market. The major problem facing the university administration is to ensure that members of its departments are willing to hire the best possible candidates. Academic tenure is seen to be a necessary condition for this. The analysis is also consistent with other aspects of the academic environment including "tenure-track" appointments, contract buy-outs, early retirement plans, and, when a budget crunch hits, the elimination of entire departments. The results extend in a simple way to other organizations in which members have an input into overall decisions.