Knowledge, morality and affiliation in social interaction

Knowledge, morality and affiliation in social interaction
复制标题

社会交往中的知识、道德和归属感

DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
J. Steensig
J. Steensig
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tanya Stivers;L. Mondada;J. Steensig

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

在日常社交活动中,知识展示和谈判无处不在。争论的焦点是,我们是否对某种状态有认识性的了解,以及我们对我们所知道的、我们的相对权威以及我们对这种知识的不同权利和责任有多大的把握。这种概念化隐含着知识是动态的、分级的和多维的,我们对认知资源的部署和依赖是规范地组织起来的。正如德鲁所说,“对某些种类的知识的占有和使用,有一种可保证的权利或权利的传统归属”(1991:45)。就像在任何正常组织的系统中一样,我们可以而且确实会让彼此对正当地主张我们的权利和履行我们关于知识的义务负责。正是以这种方式,我们认为认识域是道德有序的。这种对道德秩序的导向和监测似乎完全不同于在任务中使用的道德推理,这种道德推理要求判断一种给定的情景(例如,关于共享资源或无意杀人)在道德上是否可以接受(例如,Hauser 2006;Henrich等人)。2004年)。然而,微观层面的道德秩序可以理解为与其他形式的道德推理一样,是从一块布上剪下来的。这些微小的相互作用的道德标准对我们的社会关系产生了关键的影响,最直接的是通过我们与他人的时刻结盟和联系。
Introduction In everyday social interaction, knowledge displays and negotiations are ubiquitous. At issue is whether we have epistemic access to some state of affairs, but also how certain we are about what we know, our relative authority and our differential rights and responsibilities with respect to this knowledge. Implicit in this conceptualization is that knowledge is dynamic, graded and multi-dimensional and that our deployment of and reliance on epistemic resources are normatively organized. As Drew puts it, there is a “conventional ascription of warrantable rights or entitlements over the possession and use of certain kinds of knowledge” (1991: 45). As in any normatively organized system, we can and do hold one another accountable for justifiably asserting our rights and fulfilling our obligations with respect to knowledge. It is in this way that we see the epistemic domain as morally ordered. This orientation to and monitoring of the moral order might seem completely different from the moral reasoning used in tasks requiring judgements of whether a given scenario (e.g., about sharing resources or unintentionally killing someone) is morally acceptable or not (e.g., Hauser 2006; Henrich et al . 2004). However, the micro-level moral order can be understood as cut from the same cloth as other forms of moral reasoning. And these micro-interactional moral calibrations have critical consequences for our social relations, most directly through our moment-by-moment alignments and affiliations with others.