Imperfect observability of emissions and second-best emission and output taxes
Imperfect observability of emissions and second-best emission and output taxes
复制标题
排放量的不完美可观察性以及次优排放税和销项税
DOI：
10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00120-7
复制
发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
F. Gahvari
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Cremer;F. Gahvari
本文研究了当排放量无法公开观测，但可以通过昂贵的监测发现时的次优税收设计问题。一个工业界的代表性公司选择其排放量和申报，以最大限度地提高其预期利润。该文件显示：将生产中排放的边际私人利益等同于排放的边际社会损害的庇古规则得到修改，以考虑到监测和执行的资源成本;对不同部门的排放必须按不同的税率征税;每种污染货物必须征收低于排放的全部边际社会损害的有效排放税;排放税不反映标准的最佳税收目标;产出税具有庇古作用，因此目标原则失败。
This paper studies the second-best tax design problem when emissions are publicly unobservable but can be discovered through costly monitoring. A representative firm in industry chooses its emissions and declarations to maximize its expected profits. The paper shows: The Pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions is modified to take account of the resource costs of monitoring and enforcement; emissions from different sectors must be taxed at different rates; every polluting good must face an effective emission tax that is less than the full marginal social damage of emissions; emission taxes do not reflect standard optimal tax objectives; output taxes have a Pigouvian role so that the targeting principle fails.