Taxing the Rich

Taxing the Rich
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对富人征税

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2791098
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发表时间:
2016
期刊:
ERN: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation (Topic)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Guillaume Plantin
Guillaume Plantin
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Augustin Landier;Guillaume Plantin

文献摘要

被引文献

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富裕家庭可以用其他人在经济上不可行的手段来应对税收,例如复杂的税收计划和国际税收套利。本文研究了一个经济体,在这个经济体中,一个不平等厌恶的社会规划者面对的代理人可以获得规模收益递增的避税技术,并且可以按照他们认为合适的方式塑造他们收入的风险问题。避税的规模经济意味着最优税收在顶层是递减的。这反过来又可能引发过度冒险。
Afluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for the rest of the population, such as sophisticated tax plans and international tax arbitrage. This paper studies an economy in which an inequality-averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax-avoidance technology with increasing returns to scale, and who can shape the risk proOle of their income as they see fit. Scale economies in avoidance imply that optimal taxation is regressive at the top. This in turn may trigger excessive risk taking.