Regulation of Pollution with Asymmetric Information
Regulation of Pollution with Asymmetric Information
复制标题
信息不对称的污染监管
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-015-8346-6_2
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Laffont
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Laffont
现在人们认识到，在一个具有仁慈的社会调节者的经济体中，外部性的调节是一个标准的机制设计问题，其困难来自于调节者和经济主体之间存在的各种信息不对称。鉴于公共物品和外部性之间的微妙类比，我们可以认为这种认识可以追溯到格罗夫斯（1973）。Dasgupta、哈蒙德和Maskin（1980）、Laffont（1977）第7章更明确地阐述了使用格罗夫斯机制来调节外部性。最近，对环境问题的重新关注进一步阐明了这一范式（Baron（1985 a，B），Besanko（1987），Spulber（1989），货车Egteren（1989），Bowes，Macauley，Palmer（1991），Lewis-Sappington（1992），Segerson（1988），Xepapadeas（1991）。本文的目的是提供一个一般框架，其中包括一些静态的问题，在外部性的管制。我们开始与自然垄断的管制，创造了一个负的外部性。首先，我们假设生产水平和外部性水平之间的关系可以通过昂贵的技术来改变，并且外部性水平是可观察的。文献中很少考虑这种一般情况，文献中大多关注生产水平和外部性水平之间存在固定关系的情况。
It is now recognized that the regulation of extemalities in an economy with a benevolent social regulator is a standard mechanism design problem which derives its difficulties from the various asymmetries of infonnation existing between the regulator and the economic agents. Given the elose analogy between a public good and an extemality we can consider that this recognition goes back to Groves (1973). Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1980), Laffont (1977) Ch. 7 were more explicit about the use of the Groves mechanisms to regulate externalities. Recently, the renewal of interest for environmental issues has further articulated the paradigm (Baron (1985a, b), Besanko (1987), Spulber (1989), Van Egteren (1989), Bowes, Macauley, Palmer (1991), Lewis-Sappington (1992), Segerson (1988), Xepapadeas (1991». Tbe purpose of this paper is to provide a general framework which encompasses a number of static issues in the regulation of extemalities.We start with the regulation of a natural monopoly which creates a negative extemality. First we assume that the relationship between the level of production and the level of the externality can be modified by a costly technology and that the level of the extemality is observable. This general case has been rarely considered in the literature which has been mostly concemed with situations in which there exists a fixed relationship between the level of production and the level of externality.