FACTORS AFFECTING WITHDRAWAL FROM AN ESCALATING CONFLICT - QUITTING BEFORE ITS TOO LATE

FACTORS AFFECTING WITHDRAWAL FROM AN ESCALATING CONFLICT - QUITTING BEFORE ITS TOO LATE
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DOI:
10.1016/0022-1031(79)90011-8
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发表时间:
1979-01-01
影响因子:
3.5
通讯作者:
RUBIN, JZ
RUBIN, JZ
中科院分区:
心理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
BROCKNER, J;SHAW, MC;RUBIN, JZ

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在一项关于“诱捕”冲突的实验研究中,即决策者可能会继续花费部分资源来证明之前支出的合理性,受试者获得 4.00 美元的初始赌注,并有机会赢得额外的 2.00 美元头奖。两个自变量(资源分配过程和优先限制设置)组合在 2 × 3 设计中。一旦受试者开始投资,其中一半人必须做出“积极”决定才能继续投资。除非他们主动决定继续,否则他们的投资将自动停止,并且不再有资格获得大奖(自我终止条件)。另一半只需要做出“被动”的决定就可以继续。除非他们主动决定停止,否则他们对头奖的投资会自动增加(自我维持条件)。此外,在投资开始之前,一些受试者被要求告知实验者他们对他们计划投资的金额设定的非约束性限制(公共条件),一些受试者被要求设定一个他们自己保留的限制(私人条件),而第三组则不被要求设定一个限制(控制条件)。受试者在自给自足的条件下投入了更多的钱。此外,控制区的投资比公共区的投资要大一些。尽管公共和私人条件下的平均投资没有差异,但公共条件下的投资与之前设定的限制的偏差明显较小,这表明对这些限制的承诺更大。讨论了理论和实践意义。
In an experimental study of “entrapping” conflicts —situations in which a decisionmaker may continue to expend resources in part to justify previous expenditures—subjects were given an initial stake of $4.00 and had the opportunity to win an additional $2.00 jackpot. Two independent variables (Process of Resource Allocation and Prior Limit-Setting) were combined in a 2 × 3 design. Once the subjects had started to invest, half of them had to make an “active” decision to continue. Unless they actively decided to continue, their investments automatically ceased and they were no longer eligible for the jackpot (Selfterminating condition). The other half only had to make a “passive” decision to continue. Unless they actively decided todiscontinue, their investments for the jackpot automatically increased (Self-sustaining condition). In addition, before investments began, some subjects were asked to inform the experimenter of the nonbinding limit they had set on the amount they planned to invest (Public condition), some were asked to set a limit which they kept to themselves (Private condition), while a third group was not asked to set a limit (Control condition). Subjects invested significantly more money in the Self-sustaining condition. Also, investments were somewhat greater in the Control than the Public condition. Although the mean investments in the Public and Private conditions did not differ, those in the Public condition deviated significantly less from their earlier set limits, suggesting greater commitment to these limits. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.