Optimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions
Optimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions
复制标题
信息摩擦下的最优货币政策与透明度
DOI：
10.1111/jmcb.12334
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Wataru Tamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ken Takeda & Ryo Nakai;中井遼・武田健;武田健;武田健;武田健;Ken Takeda;福井 英次郎;福田耕治;Wataru Tamura;Hirokazu Ishise;Wataru Tamura
本文研究了企业在信息摩擦下定价的经济中的最优货币政策和中央银行透明度。经济受到两种类型的冲击，决定了有效产出水平和企业希望的加价。为了最大限度地减少福利--缩小企业之间的产出差距和价格差距，央行通过使用货币工具和披露有关已实现冲击的信息来控制企业的激励和预期。本文认为，最优政策包括披露两次冲击的线性组合，以及根据披露的信息调整货币工具。
This paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms' desired markups. To minimize the welfare‐reducing output gap and price dispersion between firms, the central bank controls firms' incentives and expectations by using a monetary instrument and disclosing information on the realized shocks. This paper shows that an optimal policy comprises the disclosure of a linear combination of the two shocks and the adjustment of monetary instruments contingent on the disclosed information.