Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games
Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games
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DOI：
10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003
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发表时间：
2011-08-01
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
van Vugt, Mark
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gillet, Joris;Cartwright, Edward;van Vugt, Mark
我们研究了在两个协调游戏中的四个球员，每个球员与金钱激励的新兴领导人的个性。我们的研究结果支持了进化假设，即领导力对群体来说是一种社会福利：领导力使追随者受益，但对个人承担领导者角色来说可能是昂贵的。在这两个经济游戏中，领导者平均比追随者做得更差--赚的钱更少。此外，社会参与者比自私的参与者更经常选择领导，领导行为和个人优势之间没有关系。我们的研究结果支持领导可以是仆人而不是自私的想法，我们注意到这一发现的含义。(C)2010爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual taking on the leader role. Across the two economic games leaders do less well - earn less money - on average than followers. Furthermore, social participants choose to lead more often than selfish participants and there is no relationship between leadership behavior and personal dominance. Our results support the idea that leadership can be servant rather than selfish and we note the implications of this finding. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.