Strike, coordination, and dismissal in uniform wage settings
Strike, coordination, and dismissal in uniform wage settings
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统一工资环境下的罢工、协调和解雇
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.04.001
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
Sadrieh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sadrieh
我们研究了一个有12个雇员和一个雇主的礼物交换博弈。当雇主可以在没有集体行动的情况下提供个人差异化的工资时，我们观察到高水平的工资、努力选择和总收入。当雇主被限制提供统一的工资时，信任和互惠由于普遍的逃避而急剧下降。逐步引入罢工和协调这两种集体行动机制，增加了员工在总收入中的份额，但并没有缓解搭便车问题。在集体行动机制中增加就业风险会推高工资，减少搭便车，并导致更高的总收入。然而，这种生产力的提高不足以实现我们在个人差别工资中观察到的高工资、努力和收入水平。
We study a gift exchange game with 12 employees and one employer. When the employer can offer individually differentiated wages in a setting without collective action, we observe high levels of wages, effort choices, and total earnings. When the employer is restricted to offering a uniform wage, trust and reciprocity drop dramatically due to widespread shirking. The stepwise introduction of two collective action mechanisms, strike and coordination, increases the employees׳ share of the total earnings, but does not mitigate the free-riding problem. Adding employment risk to the collective action setup drives up wages, reduces free-riding, and leads to higher total earnings. However, this increase in productivity is not sufficient to achieve the high levels of wages, efforts and earnings that we observe with individually differentiated wages.