Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling: Theoretical and Experimental Results
Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling: Theoretical and Experimental Results
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具有内生价格上限的拍卖：理论和实验结果
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1431744
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Robert Ferec Veszteg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tatsuyoshi Saijo;Shigehiro Serizawa;Kenju Akai;Robert Ferec Veszteg
本文分析了一个拍卖机制，排除过于乐观的投标人的启发，由日本几个地方政府采用的采购拍卖规则。我们的理论和实验结果表明，内源性排除规则降低了遭受的概率，赢得拍卖引起的金钱损失，也减轻了赢家的诅咒在实验室中的问题。然而，这种保护的代价是卖家的收入较低。
This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering a monetary loss induced by winning the auction, and also mitigates the problem of the winner's curse in the laboratory. However, this protection comes at the price of a lower revenue for the seller.