The Lesson of Bypassing
The Lesson of Bypassing
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绕过的教训
DOI：
10.1007/s13164-013-0154-3
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Shaun Nichols
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David Rose;Shaun Nichols
不相容是直觉性的这一观点是不相容的主要动机之一。毫不奇怪，为不相容论辩护的哲学家经常声称，不相容论是关于自由意志和道德责任的自然的、常识性的观点（例如，Pereboom 2001, Kane Journal of Philosophy 96:217-240 1999, Strawson 1986）。最近的一些研究发现，人们在小插曲研究中给出了明显不相容的反应。当参与者看到因果决定论宇宙的描述时，他们倾向于否认人们在那个宇宙中负有道德责任。虽然这表明人们是直觉上的不相容者，但艾迪·纳米亚斯和迪伦·默里在最近的一系列重要论文中，对这种解释提出了重要的挑战。他们认为人们混淆了决定论和回避，即一个人的精神状态缺乏因果效力。Murray和nahmia提出了新的实验，似乎证实了绕过假说。在本文中，我们使用结构方程模型来重新审视这个问题。相反，我们找到了对绕过结果的不相容解释的支持，即，不相容判断似乎导致了绕过判断。我们假设这种现象的发生是因为人们认为决策本质上是不确定的；因此，当面对决定论的描述时，他们倾向于认为决策甚至没有发生。我们在随后的三个研究中提供了证据，这些研究表明，许多参与者否认人们在确定性的宇宙中做出决定；相比之下，大多数参与者倾向于允许人们在确定性的宇宙中添加数字。综上所述，这些研究表明，回避结果并不反映出混淆，而是反映出不相容直觉的深度。
The idea that incompatibilism is intuitive is one of the key motivators for incompatibilism. Not surprisingly, then philosophers who defend incompatibilism often claim that incompatibilism is the natural, commonsense view about free will and moral responsibility (e.g., Pereboom 2001, Kane Journal of Philosophy 96:217–240 1999, Strawson 1986). And a number of recent studies find that people give apparently incompatibilist responses in vignette studies. When participants are presented with a description of a causal deterministic universe, they tend to deny that people are morally responsible in that universe. Although this suggests that people are intuitive incompatibilists, Eddy Nahmias and Dylan Murray, in a recent series of important papers, have developed an important challenge to this interpretation. They argue that people confuse determinism with bypassing, the idea that one’s mental states lack causal efficacy. Murray and Nahmias present new experiments that seem to confirm the bypassing hypothesis. In this paper, we use structural equation modeling to re-examine the issue. We find support instead for an incompatibilist explanation of the bypassing results, i.e., incompatibilist judgments seem to cause bypassing judgments. We hypothesize that this phenomenon occurs because people think of decisions as essentially indeterministic; thus, when confronted with a description of determinism they tend to think that decisions do not even occur. We provide evidence for this in three subsequent studies which show that many participants deny that people make decisions in a deterministic universe; by contrast, most participants tend to allow that people add numbers in a deterministic universe. Together, these studies suggest that bypassing results don’t reflect a confusion, but rather the depth of the incompatibilist intuition.