What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence
What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence
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DOI：
10.1006/game.2001.0904
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发表时间：
2002-07-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Vesterlund, L
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Andreoni, J;Brown, PM;Vesterlund, L
我们研究了三个具有相似均衡预测的二人公共物品博弈，但具有不同的博弈规则，不同的收益可能性，以及，正如我们所展示的，受试者的不同选择。通过游戏间的比较，我们可以推断出平衡预测是否能够很好地近似于实际行为。我们发现均衡预测即使在非均衡激励下也会失败。我们的研究结果表明，当均衡导致收益分配不均时，自私预测容易出现偏差，并且存在既增加平等又增加弱势一方收益的替代结果。此外，公平不仅仅是对受试者的最终分配；这取决于未选择的行为和已选择的行为。(C) 2002 Elsevier Science （USA）。
We explore three two-person public goods games with similar equilibrium predictions, but with different rules of the game, different payoff possibilities, and, as we show, different choices by subjects. Comparisons among games allow inferences of what may or may not determine when the equilibrium prediction is a good approximation of actual behavior. We find that the equilibrium prediction can fail even when incentives off the equilibrium enforce it. Our result suggests that the selfish prediction is prone to deviations when the equilibrium results in unequal distributions of payoffs, and there are alternative outcomes that increase both equality and the payoff of the disadvantaged party. Furthermore, fairness is a function of more than just the final allocations to subjects; it depends on the actions not chosen as well as those that are. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).