Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction
Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction
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DOI：
10.1016/j.labeco.2010.09.005
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发表时间：
2011-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Jirjahn, Uwe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cornelissen, Thomas;Heywood, John S.;Jirjahn, Uwe
我们提出了一个模型，在这个模型中，具有更大能力和更高风险承受能力的工人进入绩效工资工作，以获取租金，并将其与经典的代理模型进行对比。德国社会经济小组的估计证实了我们的模型得出的可检验的影响。首先，在控制收入之前，绩效工资工作的工人有更高的工作满意度，这是在职效用的代表。第二，在控制收入后，从事绩效工资工作的工人与不从事此类工作的工人的工作满意度相同。第三，那些从事绩效工资工作的人，风险承受能力更强，通常会报告更高的工作满意度。虽然这些研究结果支持工人获取租金的模型，但经典的代理模型并不支持这些模型。(c)2010年爱思唯尔。All rights reserved.
We present a model in which workers with greater ability and greater risk tolerance move into performance pay jobs to capture rents and contrast it with the classic agency model. Estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirm testable implications drawn from our model. First, before controlling for earnings, workers in performance pay jobs have higher job satisfaction, a proxy for on-the-job utility. Second, after controlling for earnings, workers in jobs with performance pay have the same job satisfaction as those not in such jobs. Third, those workers in performance pay jobs who have greater risk tolerance routinely report greater job satisfaction. While these findings support models in which workers capture rent, they would not be suggested by the classic agency model. (c) 2010 Elsevier By. All rights reserved.