Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration
Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration
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投资者与国家仲裁的渐进式、系统性和范式改革
DOI：
10.1017/ajil.2018.69
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Anthea Roberts
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Anthea Roberts
不完美的替代品：制度选择和投资法的改革，塞尔吉奥·普伊格和格雷戈里·谢弗介绍了比较制度分析，以评估解决投资争端的替代程序。这篇文章的动机是明确的：许多州认为投资者-国家仲裁类似于一匹从谷仓逃跑的马。为了关闭稳定的大门，许多州都在考虑各种改革提案的优点。普伊格和谢弗的全面和平衡的框架，评估权衡参与作出不同的选择，因此是一个受欢迎的和及时的干预，在这些（往往高度两极分化）的辩论。
In Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer introduce comparative institutional analysis to evaluate alternative processes for resolving investment disputes. The impetus for this article is clear: many states view investor-state arbitration as akin to a horse that has bolted from the barn. Wishing to close the stable door, a wide range of states are considering the merits of various reform proposals. Puig and Shaffer's comprehensive and balanced framework for assessing the tradeoffs involved in making different choices is thus a welcome and timely intervention in these (often highly polarized) debates.